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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the ongoing transformation process within the Islamist 
movements using the example of the moderate Islamic Action Front party in Jordan. The 
dilemma of participation in the 2010 general elections raised tensions between the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, and between doves and 
hawks of the same organizations. Internal debate on the future has started recently among 
different groups within the Islamist movement in Jordan. 
The research is based on the author‘s recent field experience in Jordan (April–July 2010, 
Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship at the American Centre of Oriental Research, Amman, Jordan). 
The author also conducted research in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, where several 
interviews were carried out with leading and lower level Islamist politicians. The dynamic 
changes within Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan and its relation with the regime has been 
used as reference point. The main question of the research was aa how the changing political 
and regional context shapes decisions of the Islamist with special attention to the acceptance of 
democratic values and human rights, political participation, and the meanings of Islamic values 
in the 21st century, possible cooperation with secular parties/movements/the regime. 
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▬▬▬▬▬ 
THE DUALITY OF ISLAMISM AND POST-ISLAMISM IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST 
The last two decades have brought fundamental political changes within Middle Eastern 
autocracies.
1
 After the collapse of the bipolar world order, several circumstances led to the so-
called vicious circle of liberalization and de-liberalization. In most of the autocratic republics, a 
more open public space began to emerge at a certain degree with a public discourse more 
concentrated on political and economic mismanagement of the country. The Islamist movements
2
 
in the Middle East have been playing on the advantages of the growing unpopularity of 
                                                          
1 The author would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the American Center of Oriental Research 
(ACOR) in Amman, which made field research possible between April-July 2010 and April-July 2007. 
2 In this paper we use the term Islamist groups borrowing the definition used by Omar Ashour: ―Islamist groups… are 
sociopolitical movements that base and justify their political principles, ideologies, behaviors and objectives on their 
understanding of Islam or on their understanding of a certain past interpretation of Islam.‖ Omar Ashour, The De-
Radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming Armed Islamist Movements  (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 4. 
Volume 1, Issue 2 Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization Fall 2011 
50 
governments and asking for further political liberalization. The regimes themselves and the 
Islamist movements are at crossroads on political participation accepting the current, non-
democratic rules of the game. Many Western politicians argue against the integration of Islamist 
movements within the existing political framework using the example of the election victory of 
Hamas in 2006 as a negative reference point. Many other experts believe in political inclusion as a 
tool of moderation, alarming us that exclusion may strengthen the possibility of re-radicalization. 
Both experts and politicians often neglect the fact that these Islamist movements are not 
homogenous entities, as serious internal differences on the future exist endangering the cohesion 
of these organizations. A re-interpretation of former political goals and ideological principles has 
started among different political fractions within Islamists.  
Recent literature on Middle Eastern political developments shows a certain kind of transformation 
within Islamist movements, what the French scholar, Olivier Roy called as ―Post-Islamism‖. The 
religious-oriented political movements have begun to emphasize the unresolved national problems 
instead of focusing only on the international scene. National integration and political participation 
became a viable alternative of a radical, military interference into the political life of the state. 
Most of the leaders of these moderate organizations accept the peaceful coexistence with the 
ruling elite, ‗postponing‘ the primary goal of implementation of an Islamic state based on Sharia 
at the same time. As Roy pointed out, the main ideological commitment of Islamists is not politics, 
but society: ―The contemporary religious revival in Islam is targeting society more than the 
state...‖3 More and more Islamist organizations have started to give up the military struggle against 
the infidel authoritarian regime, which was the ultimate answer in the 1970s by many armed 
movements (e.g. Islamic Jihad, Takfir wa-l Hijra). 
Islamist movements have embedded more deeply into the national environment. Roy notes: ―The 
mainstream Islamist movements in the 1990s have failed to produce anything resembling an 
‗Islamist International‘ along the lines of the Communist International (or Comintern).‖4 The case 
of Hamas and Fatah as rival organizations can help to understand the impact of national interests 
on political movements. Islamic symbols are not only used in the Palestinian Authority by Hamas, 
but also by the more nationalist party, Fatah. And vice versa, Fatah gains popularity by relying on 
Islamic ideals, which clearly shows that a pragmatist approach is more beneficial than relying on a 
dogmatic ideology without flexibility. Another example of the nationalization of Islamist 
movements is the Shiite Hezbollah, which was viewed by many experts as the right hand of the 
Iranian theocratic regime. Recent articles have shown a different picture. The so-called 
―libanonization‖ of Hezbollah started in 1992 with participation in the Lebanese government and 
with the gradual rejection of armed struggle.
5
  
Peter Mandeville, offering a critical evaluation of Roy argument shows that Islamist movements 
differ in their main goals. Some organizations especially those that are at odds with the regime, 




                                                          
3 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 4.  
4 Roy, Globalised Islam, 62. 
5 Graham E. Fuller, ―The Hezballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance,‖ The Washington Quarterly, 30 (2006-
2007): 143. 
6 Peter Mandeville, Global Political Islam (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 343. 
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1. Islamist movements are nationalist in orientation. 
2. Following an Islamist path does not have any strategic importance as the international 
community favours spreading democratic values over religious ideologies. 
3. Muslims do not vote according to religious beliefs, but rather their political conviction. 
4. The political participation of Islamist movements involuntary helps in the secularisation 
process of their home country. 
5. Individualistic religious approaches have taken preference over collective practices (―The 
privatization of religion‖). 
 In Asef Bayat‘s understanding, the term Post-Islamism is a condition and a project 
simultaneously. On one hand, Post-Islamism is an existing reality, but on the other hand, it is a 
plan under discussion among Islamists on how to combine Islam with the values of modernity 
(democracy, liberalism, human rights, etc.).
7
 Some Islamist parties embrace the idea that modern 
values are inherent in Islam, rejecting what several Western scholars and politicians argue that 
Islam is a backward religion and Islam and democracy are incompatible.  
It must be underlined that with the presence of a Post-Islamist trend, classical Islamism is not a 
phenomenon of the past. ―But the advent of post-Islamism, as a trend, should not be seen 
necessarily as the historical end of Islamism‖ – wrote Bayat.8 According to his interpretation of 
current trends in the Middle East, the Egyptian Wasat Party, the Turkish Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), and the Indian Jami‘at-i Islami belong to the category of Post-Islamism. Movements 
like the Palestinian Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or the Jordanian Islamic Action 
Front represent (classical) Islamism. However, in my opinion there is no clear dividing line among 
different types of movements, especially because the new movements usually split from the 
mother organization, as was the case with the Egyptian Wasat Party. The existence of divergent 
fractions within the Islamist movements must be taken into consideration. 
Politicians and experts often show Islamist movements as static political actors with never-
changing political agenda. It is often neglected that an intensive debate on the future started 
between members belonging to the different political wings (and different generations) of these 
popular societal movements. The main disagreement among political fractions is about 
participation in the general elections and the commitment to the original ideology of the founding 
fathers. On one hand, the usually called ―dovish members‖ think that a Sharia-based society and 
political system is the best solution for the contemporary challenges of their host country. 
However, at the same time they also noticed that the implementation of the ideological principles 
is not possible in the 21
st
 century. These moderates show a willingness to form ad-hoc coalitions 
with secular parties and cooperate with the regime on issues with shared interests. On the other 
hand, the conservatives (―hawkish‖) see any kind of political participation as a legitimization 
                                                          
7 Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press), 11. 
8 Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 13.  
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given to the oppressive policies of the regime. The existing political fractions often correspond 
with members belonging to different generations.
9
  
THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Many Islamist movements consider the opportunity cost of exclusion higher than political 
participation. However, political inclusion is not only a decision of Islamists themselves, but 
usually it is the privilege of the ruling elite. A minimum level of mutual understanding and an 
acceptance of the existence and political activity of the other is necessary, but not satisfactory 
precondition for political inclusion. The compromise between Islamists and the regime usually 
touches upon the rules of the political game. These non-democratic arrangements are used as the 
safety valves of the political elite, minimizing the possibility of the evolution of a popular political 
party in the opposition. Despite the authoritarian structure of the state, many of the moderate 
Islamists are still convinced of the advantages of manoeuvring into the political labyrinth, which 
offers no real influence on political decisions. Some moderate movements are legally licensed 
political parties (e.g. Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan, Justice and Development Party in 
Morocco, Islah Party in Yemen), while others belong to the semi-legal (Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt), or illegal categories (Muslim Brotherhood in Syria).  
A re-interpretation of former political goals and ideological principles has started among different 
political fractions within the ranks of the Islamists. These political wings often coincide with 
members belonging to different generations. Khalil Anani, an expert on Islamist movements, 
analyzed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and found four generations of members very different 
aspirations, with very different experiences.
10
 Some of the members who were among the 
founding fathers are still alive and they are the more conservative element. The other generation 
lived under the Nasser years witnessed the radicalization of the movement, and they are loyal to 
the more radical interpretation of Sayyid Qutb, who was hanged by Nasser. The youngest 
generation is the most interesting; they live in a very different political environment than their 
predecessors. We were told that Islamist movements are backward political actors in the post-
modern society. It is not true. The youngest generation has access to the latest technology, they 
communicate among the members through blogs and chats. As most of the blogs (like Ana 
Ikhwan) are in Arab language, these blogs are not exclusively Egyptian or Jordanian, but Arab. 
The youngest generation is very skeptical about the old guard and usually they are in the middle 
(wasat). Sometimes they try to break away from the parent organization and form a new political 
party (Wasat Party). They are in the middle between the doves and hawks. The same story is valid 
in the case of Hamas, which after the outbreak of the second intifada started a debate on 
participation in the upcoming elections. Hamas shows the major dilemma of inclusion or 
exclusion. The moderate wing led by Ismail Haniyya argued in favor of participation, accepting 
the non-democratic rules of the game, while the more radical element – Khaled Meshal in 
Damascus – stressed the importance of the armed struggle. Most of the moderate movements in 
                                                          
9 Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzavy and Marina Ottaway, ―Islamists Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab 
World: Exploring the Gray Zones,‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Herbert-Quandt Stiftung. Middle 
East Series, 67 (March 2006): 7. 
10 Khalil al-Anani, ―The Young Brotherhood in Search of a New Path,‖ Current Trends in Islamic Ideology, 9 (2009), 
Hudson Institute, online: http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-young-brotherhood-in-search-of-a-new-path 
(accessed 01 September 2010). 
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the Middle East face the same dilemma: participation or re-radicalization. The result of the 
international isolation of the Hamas government led to re-radicalization in the Gaza strip. More 
radical movements belong to the Al-Qaeda, Jihadi Salafism emerged as a response to the failure of 
Hamas. They totally ban music and one of their political leaders even called for an Islamic 
Emirate in Gaza. Hamas killed most of the members of this organization. It shows us that Islamist 
movements cannot be analyzed as static political actors who never change. The other general 
question about the future of the Islamists is whether they are committed more to the founding 
ideology and to establishing an Islamist state on the base of Shariah or they are more pragmatic 
and open to hear the needs of their voters (context driven). Several studies have shown that many 
Islamist movements dropped their primary goal to establish an Islamic state and realized the 
opportunity to participate in elections and forming coalition with other non-Islamist parties or 
even more committed to certain kind of cooperation with the regime.   
―Inclusion leads to moderation‖ hypothesis should be tested in a more careful manner. Th much 
criticized transition paradigm believes in the inclusion of radical groups in the democratization 
process.
11
 If the alternative cost of participating in the election process is higher than keeping the 
radical tone of the movement, then acceptance of the democratic and non-violent method will 
prevail. In the Middle East, however, the rules of the game are usually undemocratic, which means 
that enforcing the democratic principle does not mean the possibility of challenging the regime. 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE 
JORDANIAN POLITICAL MILIEU 
In a recently published article, Tamara Cofman Wittes has analysed three different groups of 
Islamist movements regarding the possibility of engaging them politically.
12
 The first category 
used by the author is a small group of radical organizations linked to the so-called global jihad. 
The most prominent example for that category is Al-Qaeda, or second generation of Al-Qaeda 
type organizations targeting mainly Western interests. Engaging them is not possible on the short-
run. A recent survey in the Islamic World carried out by Gallup has showed the weakness of such 
radicals. According to the data, only 7 percent of 1.5 billion Muslims support any kind of 
violence, while there is a ‗silenced majority‘ who rejects the use of force.13  
Within the second category, we found Islamists focusing mainly on national or local issues 
combining peaceful and militant methods as well. Hamas in the Palestinian Authority or 
Hezbollah in Lebanon are the most prominent examples of this group. As Wittes said: ‗they can 
always use bullets to cancel ballots (…) and they seldom want to give up the privileges that the 
gun brings them.‘14 Participation in politics is not a positive step toward democratizing autocratic 
regimes.  
The third category of Islamists are the peaceful, local, nationalist ones who see participation in the 
political process as the sole legitimate method for challenging the regime. Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front Party, or Turkey‘s AKP are the most important Islamist 
                                                          
11 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 11-18. 
12 T. Cofman Wittes, ―Islamist Parties. Three Kinds of Movements,‖ Journal of Democracy, 19 (2008): 7-13. 
13 J. L. Esposito and D. Mogahed, eds., Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think, (New York: Gallup 
Press, 2007), 69.  
14 T. Cofman Wittes, Islamist Parties, 8. 
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organizations accepting the formal rules of the game. If certain conditions are met, these non-
radical groups are the best example for inclusion within the political space.  
GLOBAL JIHAD IN JORDAN 
In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, all of the three above-mentioned types of Islamist 
movements exist. Organizations linked to global jihadi activity were never popular in Jordan. The 
Jordanian society has strongly condemned the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States, and the 
government officially expressed its commitment to Washington in the war against terrorism. On 
the other hand, close political ties with Washington has made Jordanian public opinion suspicious 
about foreign policy initiatives of the King or government. According to the poll conducted by 
Pew, 43 percent of the Jordanian population supported terror attack against civilians in order to 
defend Islam in the summer of 2002. The sympathy toward suicide bombing however dropped to 
29 percent in 2006.
15
  
Mentioning just a few examples of names and organizations with links to global jihad, Abdullah 
Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, al-Maqdisi and the radical movement called Hizb ul-Tahrir (HT) 
are of special importance. The root of every kind of Islamist activity, whether peaceful or violent, 
is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which officially came into existence in 1945. 
According to many sources, the MB started its activity during the 1930‘s under the patronage of 
the Egyptian MB. Even Abdullah Azzam, who was at the forefront of the Afghan jihad against the 
Soviet Union, came from the Jordanian MB. As Shmuel Bar in his article on the history of the 
Jordanian MB has noted, the radical wing led by Abdullah Azzam, which left the country for 
Afghanistan during the 1980‘s, was unique in Jordan. Azzam and his followers were not satisfied 
with the peaceful strategy of the leadership; they wanted a more rapid political and societal change 
through armed jihad.
16
 While Azzam died in Afghanistan in 1989, several of the so-called Arab 
Afghans (Maqdisi, Zarqawi) returned to Jordan, participating in the recruitment of new Salafis. 
The agglomeration of Amman, especially Zarqa (where Zarqawi was born) and Salt, became a 
centre of radical Islamists. After several years in prison, Zarqawi joined the Taliban in 1999 with 
several hundreds of Jordanian followers. Until the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States, 
radical jihadi activism was on a low level in the Kingdom. Maqdisi was also imprisoned in 1996.
17
  
However, the outbreak of the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003 made the Kingdom a target for 
suicide bombers. Abu Musab al-Zarkawi soon became the leader of the so-called Iraqi Al-Qaeda, 
planning attacks against Jordanian interests. The mass influx of Iraqi refugees from March 2003 
also made the Kingdom vulnerable. Jordan hosts around one million Iraqi refugees, who settled 
mainly in and around Amman. The Iraqi uprising had its immediate consequences on the security 
of Jordan: the suicide attack on 9 November 2005 demonstrated the existence of illegitimate Iraqi 
armed groups in the country headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.
18
 The regime responded with an 
illiberal counter-terrorism law, which enlarged the powers of the security services. It is greatly 
                                                          
15 ―The Great Divide. How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other? Europe‘s Muslims More Moderate‖, Pew Global 
Attitude Project‗ June 2006. [Online:] 
 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253 (accessed 10 June 2009). 
16 S. Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African 
Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1998), 31. 
17 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 202-203. 
18 Many Jordanians share the conviction that Jordan will not be able to avoid the impacts of the security situation in Iraq. 
The suicide bombings against Amman‘s 5-star hotels in 2005 were the first step toward a worsening security prospect. 
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feared in Jordan that the infiltration of terrorist groups will subvert the societal harmony of the 
Kingdom. Zarqawi was killed in Iraq by American forces in 2006.
19
 
The international community expressed its recognition of the commitment of the Kingdom to 
condemn religious extremism and terrorism. This policy is echoed with the Amman Message 
launched in November 2004 by King Abdullah II, whose goal was to promote a moderate form of 
Islam in the region and to win the loyalty of the religious opposition.
20
 The promulgation of the 
Amman Message coincided with the growing fear about the spillover of Iraq‘s civil strife in 
Jordan, especially after the suicide attacks at Amman‘s hotels in 2005.  
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) was founded by a Palestinian member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Nabahani in 1952, a former student of al-Azhar in Cairo. His 
views on the role of the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Jihad and on the establishment of an 
Islamic state on the principle of Khilafa had differed severely from the standpoint of the leadership 
of the MB.
21
 Nabahani had tried to register his movement as a political party in the Kingdom, but 
it was refused by the regime several times. HT as an illegal organization attempted to overthrow 
the monarchy in Jordan, but the movement denied this fact. Today, HT is not a significant political 
group in the Kingdom; its main area of operation is Central Asia and the Muslim communities in 
Western Europe. 
THE MODERATE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE REGIME 
As mentioned before, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood originated in the 1930‘s, when the 
writings of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, influenced Muslims around 
the Middle East. In 1945, Emir Abdullah himself delivered the inauguration speech of the 
Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which marked the beginning of a positive approach 
by the Hashemite dynasty toward Islamists. The regime played the Islamist card in order to 
balance the powerful secular-nationalist wave calling for revolution. Only the radical Hizb al-
Tahrir (HT) was banned during the Cold War years and the Brotherhood remained a political 
party and civil organization. The Muslim Brotherhood won only 8.3 percent of the votes in the 
1956 election, which showed the limited popularity of Islamism at that time.
22
 From 1957 till 
1992, all political parties were banned in Jordan; the Muslim Brotherhood was a semi-legal 
political organization focusing on non-political issues (charity).  
In this short paper, it is not possible to go into details about the history of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but it must be noted that at historical turning points (1957, 1970) members of the 
Ikhwan supported the controversial policies of the regime. In 1957, when leftist revolutionary 
forces challenged the legitimacy of the Hashemite dynasty and the monarchy, the MB – despite 
differences over the dismissal of Glubb Pasha during the early 1950‘s – backed the decision of 
                                                          
19 See on recent Salafi activism in the Kingdom, J. J. Escobar Stemmann, ―Islamic Activism in Jordan‖, Athena 
Intelligence Journal, 3 (2008): 16-17. 
20 The Amman Interfaith Message. [Online:] 
 http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=54&lang=en (accessed 15 
April 2007). 
21 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 200. 
22 E. Lust-Okar, ―The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?‖ International Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, 33 (2002): 545-569. 
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King Hussein striking down the Nasser-backed political forces in the Kingdom.
23
 In 1970, when 
the civil war broke out between the Palestinian fighters and the monarchy (Black September), the 
Muslim Brotherhood again proved its loyalty to the regime. 
From the beginning of 1980‘s, the relations between the regime and the Ikhwan started to change. 
The main controversial issue behind the worsening relationship was the support for the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970‘s and early 1980‘s. The Jordanian branch of the Ikhwan 
helped their Syrian counterpart in order to overthrow the secularist republic of the Alawite 
minority in Syria, which caused tensions between the Hashemites and the Asad-regime in 
Damascus. However, the crackdown of the Syrian Brotherhood in Hama in 1982 forced King 




The economic crisis of the 1980‘s in the Kingdom and the growing unpopularity of the regime, 
placed Ikhwan on the opposite side of the government. Despite the fact that all political parties 
were banned until 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood had chosen to participate in the 1989 elections 
and Islamists (members of MB and independents as well) won 33 seats in the Lower House of 
Parliament. A fragmented opposition—consisting of leftists and Islamists—dominated the 
Kingdom‘s first quasi-freely elected Parliament. The political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, 




INTERNAL DEBATES WITHIN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE 
ROLE OF THE HAMAS FACTOR 
The Jordanian monarchy is a unique example of political engagement of moderate Islamism in the 
Middle East. This paper shows that the participation of moderate Islamists in the political process 
is one of the most effective ways to pacify the radicals. The political evolution of the Hashemite 
Kingdom is quite different from other Middle Eastern countries, but the experience on the history 
of Islamism in Jordan is vital for our understanding of other regime types.  
From the beginning of 1990‘s, the Islamist Action Front became the most popular political party 
in the monarchy. Generally, political parties are very weak in Jordan. The election system favours 
independent leaders affiliated with a tribe supporting the dynasty. The election law in force was 
drafted in 1993, months before the elections (in 1993) to marginalize the vociferous critics of the 
regime, the Islamic Action Front, which dominated (as independent candidates) the legislature 
from 1989 till 1993. The 1993 election law was based on the one man, one vote system, whereby 
eligible citizens can cast only one vote per district. The authorities changed the size of voting 
districts in favour of tribal areas, thereby playing on personal relations and loyalties. The voting 
system evidently placed parties at the margin of political life appealing to the neo-patriarchal 
arrangement of the state.
26
 In the Hashemite Kingdom, usually tribal leaders have been elected as 
                                                          
23 P. Robins,  A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 99-102.  
24 S. Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 38.  
25 R. Curtis, Jordan in Transition. From Hussein to Abdullah (London: Lynee Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2002), 22.  
26 F. Schirin, Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a ‗Safety Valve‘, ‗Middle Eastern Studies‘ Vol. 41, No. 6, 
(2005): 889-898. 
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MP. Political parties are viewed as suspicious institutions, potentially influenced by foreign 
powers.  
When the leaders of the Ikhwan decided to establish a political party, the assumption was to fill 40 
percent of the Islamic Action Front with independent Islamists, and the rest (60 percent) with 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In reality, the Muslim Brotherhood has been dominating by 
the Islamic Action Front Party and independent Islamists have been marginalized from the 
beginning. This initiated a debate among members of the party on participation in the election 
process, the role of women in politics, the meaning of the dreamed Islamic states in the 21
st
 
century, etc. A major transformation process has started within the ranks of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has become a Western-like political movement. As Anne Sofie Roald noted in 
her article: ‗the three religious concepts, shura, ‗Islamic state‘, and ‗female leadership‘ have all 
turned in a secular direction in the policy of the Muslim Brotherhood, as shura has become 
‗western democracy‘, ‗Islamic state‘ has become ‗civil state‘, and ‗Islamic leadership‘ has, to a 
certain extent, started to involve even women in the pattern of gender equality.
27
  
The old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood (e.g. Ishaq Farhan) emphasized its opposition to allow 
the participation of the Ikhwan in the election process from 1989. They argued that the current 
political regime in Jordan is not democratic, and with participation in the election process, the 
Muslim Brotherhood would be a party to the oppressive actions of the government. It must be 




Islamic Action Front participated in general elections in 1993 but boycotted the 1997 elections. 
The normalization policy with the State of Israel and the peace treaty in 1994 marked the 
beginning of a radicalization process within the ranks of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and 
the IAF as well. The IAF with several other parties in the opposition have started an anti-
normalization campaign criticizing the foreign policy of the King. 
After the 11
th
 September terror attack and failure of the Oslo peace process, the Islamic Action 
Front party has attracted more citizens, especially from the Palestinian community in and around 
Amman. The support for the Palestinian Hamas has been growing since the mid 1990‘s. 
Historically, the relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood started after World 
War II. The older founding fathers of Hamas were members of the (Jordanian) Muslim 
Brotherhood and shared a common vision of Islamization of the society. In 1988, the Muslim 
Brotherhood helped Hamas members to compose the Charter of Hamas, which called for jihad in 
historical Palestine. Hamas has maintained an office within the building of the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood, which proved the strong political ties between them. A modus vivendi has developed 
between the leaders of Hamas and King Hussein tolerating the operation of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement in the Kingdom. However, in 1999 King Abdullah II chose to shut down the office of 
Hamas in Amman and expelled its leaders due to security reasons.  
The elections held in June 2003 witnessed the return of the Islamic Action Front to electoral 
politics after boycotting participatory politics in 1997, despite its heavy criticism of the regime. 
                                                          
27 Anne Sofie Roald, ―From Theocracy to Democracy? Towards Secularisation and Individualisation in the Policy of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan‖, Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, 8 (2008): 106-107. 
28 J. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 158. 
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Contrary to all expectations, the Islamic Action Front performed poorly, winning only 17 
parliamentary seats, despite the fact that the outbreak of the war against Iraq enlarged its support 
base. Also 5 independent Islamists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, won seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies.
29
 The results of the 2003 elections did not challenge the status quo: 
independent tribal leaders dominate the 14th Parliament. Jordanians of Palestinian origin are 
under-represented in the new legislation. They secured only between 17 and 25 seats, which prove 
the imbalances in voter districts.
30
  
The Hamas victory in the Palestinian national elections held in March 2006 caused growing fears 
in Amman of an Islamist takeover of the Hashemite dynasty. Officially, King Abdullah labelled 
Palestinian elections as democratic, and he raised his voice against any interference into the 
internal affairs of the country. Hamas maintains close ties with the main Jordanian Islamist 
organization, Islamist Action Front. Zaki Bin Arsheed, a politician close to Hamas, was elected in 
March 2006 as the secretary general of the party. The outcome of the Palestinian election affected 
political harmony between Islamists and the regime: specifically the MP‘s of IAF called for 
further political liberalization and the adoption of a new election law with equal opportunities for 
all political parties. In 2006, the intelligence service discovered a secret armoury operated by 
Hamas members in Jordan.  
In 2007, Islamists boycotted municipal elections. They participated in the 2007 general elections, 
but the outcome of the elections was a political disaster for the Islamic Action Front Party. Only 6 
of its 22 candidates won a seat in the Parliament, which was a major setback for the party. The 
main reason behind this negative performance was a miscalculation of the popularity of the 
organization among voters. They were sure that all of the 22 candidates would win a seat, as it was 
in the previous elections. However, the situation was different. Why did they fail? One of the 
answers was the political marginalization of the Islamist movement by the regime. As the relations 
between the regime and the IAF worsened, especially in the post 9/11 contexts, Islamists were 
ousted from university campuses, from NGOs, etc. Only professional unions were open for them. 
A strict control started, especially at the University of Jordan, among student organizations active 
in campuses. One of the techniques to oust professors affiliated with the MB was not to renew 
their contracts or simply ask them to leave the university. The regime accused MB of playing in 
the hands of the ‗Shia crescent‘. The Jordanian King was the one who introduced the term Shia 
Crescent after the outbreak of the Third Gulf War (2003), referring to the cooperation between 
Iran-Syria-Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas. The other thing equally important was that the IAF 
could not reach to the ordinary Jordanian audience, and kept focusing mainly on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. According to CSS polls, the Transjordanian cast their ballots according to 
their tribal affiliation and not their political ideology.
31
 Tribal affiliation is not a top priority 
among Palestinian citizens. The current crisis within the movement started in the middle of the 
election campaign. While the MB wanted to boycott completely both elections, the IAF members 
preferred participation. For the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood participation meant 
                                                          
29 R. R. Curtis and J. Schwedler, ―Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 Elections in Jordan‖, 
Middle East Policy, 11 (2004): 138-151. 
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jordan.org/subDefault.aspx?PageId=36&PollType=2) , accessed 10 November 2010. 
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contributing to the legitimization of the oppressive methods of the regime. IAF members argued 
that they lost more in boycotting the elections. The moderate wing, doves, within IAF wants to be 
more independent from the parent organization, and an internal struggle has started. Participating 
in the general elections served the interest of the moderates. In 2008, a hawkish politician, Hamam 
Said replaced Salam Falahat in the general leader position of MB. Hamam Said, who is sceptical 
about political participation has frequently criticized the regime, and called for new election law.  
In August 2008, for the first time the Jordanian mukhabarat met with several Hamas officials from 
Beirut and discussed a new modus vivendi between the regime and the Islamist organization. It 
seems that the Jordanian government accepted the fact that Hamas is a political reality in the 
Middle East and ignoring it is contra productive. Officially Hamas has no relations with IAF.  
The visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Jordan in 2009 caused tensions between the regime and the 
IAF. Zaki bin Irshaid said in an interview that Pope Benedict XVI must apologise to Muslims first 
before his visit to the Kingdom pointing to the controversial Pope‘s Regensburg speech in 2006.  
In May 2009, Zaki bin Irshaid, the leader of the IAF resigned from his post due to internal debate 




The regional factor is very important for understanding the rise of the less moderate elements 
within the movement. The Islamist movement politically benefited from the humanitarian crisis in 
the Gaza Strip organizing demonstrations against Israeli blockade, which started in 2007. The 
Operation Caste Lead, the military intervention of Israel against Hamas in Gaza at the end of 
2008, and January 2009 has contributed to the sympathy towards Palestinians. Islamists, who 
control the professional unions organized demonstrations immediately after the Gaza flotilla attack 
in Amman (4
th
 circle). Several thousand attended the demonstration. As the general public opinion 
is very negative about Israel, the King has started to co-opt an anti-Israeli rhetoric. In his interview 
with Wall Street Journal, he criticized the current Israeli government and told the American 
audience that Israel endangered its existence due to its politics (settlement policy issues).
33
 And 
right after the Gaza flotilla raid, the King brought to Jordan most of the Muslim citizens who were 
aboard the Turkish ship, offering them medical treatment and helping them to go home. The 
strategy of the King worked very well; the regime, using a part of the rhetoric of the Islamist 
movement, distanced the population from Islamists.   
A general election within the IAF organization is expected this spring. After the first meeting, 
which elected the Shura Council, the main decision-making body of the IAF, a major split 
surfaced within the movement and it was propagated widely in the media causing frustration for 
the Islamist movement. As usual, the Shura Council of the parent organization, the Muslim 
Brotherhood is the body responsible for the nomination of the next Secretary General of the party, 
and they nominated Zaki bin Irshaid, the former secretary general who resigned in 2009. The 
doves did not accept this decision and boycotted the session, which was supposed to elect Zaki bin 
Irshaid. However, Zaki bin Irshaid withdrew his nomination and Hamam Said disclosed that a 
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kind of reconciliation had started within the movement. The global leadership of the movement 
from Egypt visited Amman to arrange a settlement of the dispute. The doves did not nominate a 
new person for the position, leaving the job open to the doves, who nominated several candidates. 
On 26
th
 June, in a meeting of the Party‘s council, Hamzah Mansour was elected the General 
Secretary. The election of Hamzah Mansour – a member of the moderate fraction – is a 
compromise between the doves and the hawks.  
The hawks prefer election boycott, while the doves prioritize participation. The executive director 
of the IAF issued an announcement before the beginning of the registration process calling the 
members to register themselves for the upcoming elections, but it does not mean participation. The 
probability of a boycott of the next elections was very high, especially after the King endorsed the 
new election law. The election law keeps the ―one man, one system‖, which is politically 
unacceptable for the Islamists. In 2010, Islamists started a discussion with secular parties about the 
election law and a joint boycott of the next election to draw the attention of the international 
community to the oppressive nature of the regime. According to the polls conducted by the Centre 
of Strategic Studies, the popularity of the IAF is very low, much less than 10% among voters. 
Finally, IAF called for a boycott of the elections, which was held in November 2010. In 2011, IAF 
accepted a new strategic document for enlarging the members of the party, which was estimated 
around 3000 by experts. 
The generalization of the Jordanian model is not possible because of the unique historical context 
and political circumstances. The Islamic Action Front Party is a popular, but politically 
marginalized movement. The example of the Islamic Action Party shows that legalized Islamist 
parties are not inevitable winners of general elections in the Middle East, and they can be co-opted 
by the autocratic (or semi-democratic) regime successfully. However, the future of the Islamists‘ 
participation in politics of the Kingdom is still an open question. Post-Islamism is not a strong 
force in Jordan (as in Egypt), it is a rather marginalized fraction cooperating with the regime, and 
(classical) Islamism has also lost popularity in recent years. 
 
Volume 1, Issue 2 Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization Fall 2011 
61 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. al-Anani, Khalil ―The Young Brotherhood in Search of a New Path,‖ Current Trends in 
Islamic Ideology, 9 (2009), Hudson Institute, online: 
http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-young-brotherhood-in-search-of-a-new-path 
(accessed 01 September 2010) 
2. Ashour,Omar.The De-Radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming Armed Islamist 
Movements.London and New York: Routledge, 2009. 
3. Bar, S. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle 
Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1998. 
4. Bayat, Asef. Making Islam Democratic, Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
5. Brown,Nathan J. AmrHamzavy and Marina Ottaway, ―Islamists Movements and the 
Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones‖. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace – Herbert-QuandtStiftung. Middle East Series, 67 (March 2006):  
6. Curtis , R. R. and J. Schwedler, ―Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 
2003 Elections in Jordan‖, Middle East Policy, 11 (2004): 138-151. 
7. Curtis, R. Jordan in Transition. From Hussein to Abdullah. London: LyneeRienner 
Publishers, Boulder 2002.  
8. Esposito, J. L. and D. Mogahed, eds., Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really 
Think.New York: Gallup Press, 2007.  
9. Fuller,Graham E. ―The Hezballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance.‖ In The 
Washington Quarterly, 30 (2006-2007). 
10. Lust-Okar, E. ―The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?‖ In International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 33 (2002): 545-569. 
11. Mandeville, Peter. Global Political Islam. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
12. Parker,Ch. ―Transformation without Transition: Electoral Politics, Network Ties, and the 
Persistence of the Shadow State in Jordan.‖In Elections in the Middle East. What Do They 
Mean?, ed. I. A. Hamdy,Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004.  
13. Roald, Anne Sofie.―From Theocracy to Democracy? Towards Secularisation and 
Individualisation in the Policy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan‖, Journal of Arabic and 
Islamic Studies, 8 (2008): 106-107. 
14. Robins,P. A History of Jordan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
15. Roy, Olivier. Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst & Company, 
2004. 
16. Schirin, F. Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a ‗Safety Valve‘, ‗Middle 
Eastern Studies‘ Vol. 41, No. 6, (2005): 889-898. 
17. Schwedler, Jillian. Faith in Moderation, Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
